Admissibility of the Defendant’s Criminal Records at Trial

James B. Jacobs

Criminal Law and Procedure, New York University School of Law, New York, USA.

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2013.43015                

Abstract

The jury trial, which is a hallmark of the Anglo-American adversary system, requires close attention to the evidence that it is permissible for the lay jurors to hear. No evidentiary issue has proved more contentious than the admissibility of witnesses’, especially defendants’, prior criminal history because of concern that the lay jurors might prejudicially infer present guilt from past criminality. This article explains the complex evidentiary rules for admitting criminal history to prove guilt and to impeach witness credibility. It suggests that inquisitorial trial procedure, which historically has been unconcerned that judges know about the defendant’s prior criminal history while they are determining present guilt may have to restrict admissibility of such evidence as lay juries become more common.

Keywords

Prior Crimes Evidence; Jury Trial; Rules of Evidence; European Trials

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

[1]	18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006). It shall be unlawful for any person… who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year… to … possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
[2]	Advisory Comm. Note to 1991 404(b).
[3]	Davis v. Alaska, 415 US 308, 319 (1974).
[4]	Fed. R. Evid. 403.
[5]	Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) Evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
[6]	Fed. R. Evid. 413 In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
[7]	Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) advisory committee’s note.
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[9]	Fed. R. Evid.414, In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
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[42]	United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2001). Holding that evidence of prior bad acts to prove knowledge and intent elements of a criminal offense is admissible even though defendant had offered to stipulate to these mental elements.
[43]	Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.103-322, §320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,701 et seq.).
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