The Principal-Agent Approach to Politics: Policy Implementation and Public Policy-Making

Jan-Erik Lane

University of Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany.

DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2013.32012                

Abstract

The principal-agent models may be employed to elucidate central problems in interaction between principals and agents in both policy implementation and public policy-making concerning performance and remuneration. One then hits upon the double principal-agent relationships that are typical of the policy cycle, from policy-making to policy implementation and back: 1) government as principal for agents in public service delivery; 2) the population as principal for political agents under various forms of rulership.

Keywords

Principal-Agent Interaction; Asymmetric Information; Moral Hazard; Adverse Selection; Bureaucracy; New Public Management; Rule of Law; Long-Term Contracting; Short-Term Contracting; Looting

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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