Which Spouse First Decides in the Household? The Dynamics of Bargaining

Joaquín Andaluz Funcia, Miriam Marcén, José Alberto Molina Chueca

Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain.

DOI: 10.4236/tel.[phone]                

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of which spouse first decides in the intrahousehold decision on the time that each spouse devotes to the provision of a family good. Specifically, we adopt a dynamic approach by developing a supergame, with the status quo being sequential, to study the influence of the discount factor, which measures the importance of the future, on the set of sustainable agreements in intrahousehold bargaining. We first show that cooperation is easily sustained. We then observe a positive relationship between the discount factor and the proportion of time that the follower devotes to housework, when focusing on sustainable agreements, with this finding being maintained even if the follower has higher wages than the spouse leader.

Keywords

Family Bargaining; Stackelberg Game; Family Good

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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