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Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly Models with Complementary Goods

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DOI: 10.4236/me.2010.11003    4,824 Downloads   8,343 Views   Citations

ABSTRACT

This paper considers domestic (resp. international) Bertrand mixed duopoly competition in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm and a domestic (resp. foreign) profit-maximizing private firm produce complementary goods. The main purpose of the paper is to present and to compare the equilibrium outcomes of the two mixed duopoly models.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

K. Ohnishi, "Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly Models with Complementary Goods," Modern Economy, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2010, pp. 43-46. doi: 10.4236/me.2010.11003.

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