Experimental Research on Asymmetric R&D Investment of R&D/Product Problem

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.21016   PDF   HTML     3,354 Downloads   6,187 Views   Citations

Abstract

In this paper, an experiment is designed to verify the model findings of asymmetric R&D investment in open environment. 25 MBA students voluntarily participated in the experiment. They were divided into five groups representing different corporate decision-makers with different technical level to participate in repeated R&D/production game. The results show that low technology players will choose to take free ride of high technology competitors’ R&D investment and spare much expenditure at the stage of sequential game, while in a synchronize game a R&D race is the rational choice to both sides. The results fit well with model research, and they can also confirm that the equilibrium of model can be found by people in reality.

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H. Zhang, "Experimental Research on Asymmetric R&D Investment of R&D/Product Problem," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 1, 2012, pp. 83-86. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.21016.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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