A Theory of Epistemic Justification Based on Cause and Reason ()
ABSTRACT
Since Gettier published
his famous “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, epistemologists (including Gettier) have referred
to “Epistemic Justification1” as “having good reason to believe” and a series of discussions around
Justification, but in this article, I will argue that the previous
understanding of Justification is inadequate and that “Justification” as a
necessary condition for knowledge should itself contain at least two connotations,
“Reasons” and “Causes”. I will show that my point of view can be supported by at least two reasons. First, “having good reason to believe” as a normative understanding of justification is not sufficient for the definition
of knowledge, and it is weaker compared to reliabilism of justification, which
argues justification is not even a necessary condition for knowledge. Second,
if we accept that “Justification” should be interpreted as “having good cause to
believe”, we will be unable to escape a kind of skepticism named Agrrippa’s
Skepticism (AS), which accuses all Justifications are impossible, is a type of
skepticism about Justification. In this article, I will show that 1) “Justification” is a necessary condition for knowledge, so,
“Justification” must mean more than merely “having sufficient cause to believe”. 2) What AS presupposed is this traditional theory of Justification, and if
we wish to prevent AS, we cannot simply interpret “justification” as “have a
good reason to believe”. 3) Explain whether a new understanding of
Justification, compatible with Cause and Reason, is possible.
Share and Cite:
Gu, X. X. (2022). A Theory of Epistemic Justification Based on Cause and Reason.
Open Journal of Philosophy,
12, 233-240. doi:
10.4236/ojpp.2022.122015.
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