Anti-Corruption, Government Subsidies and Corporate Innovation Investment—Based on the Perspective of Rent-Seeking Theory

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ISSN Print: 2168-5428
ISSN Online: 2168-541X
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"Anti-Corruption, Government Subsidies and Corporate Innovation Investment—Based on the Perspective of Rent-Seeking Theory"
written by Yingying Liang, Qi Wang,
published by Chinese Studies, Vol.6 No.1, 2017

has been cited by the following article(s):

[1]	Anti-corruption and CEO compensation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China
	Economic Modelling, 2022

[2]	Does government transparency shape firm decentralization? Evidence from a natural experiment in China
	Emerging Markets Review, 2022

[3]	GOVERNMENT SuBSIDIES, RENT-SEEKING AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA
	2021

[4]	Corruption-induced CEO compensation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China
	2021

[5]	Do Innovation Subsidies Policy Improve the Innovation Performance of Enterprises?
	2019

[1]	Anti-corruption and CEO compensation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China Economic Modelling, 2022 DOI:10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105697

[2]	Does government transparency shape firm decentralization? Evidence from a natural experiment in China Emerging Markets Review, 2022 DOI:10.1016/j.ememar.2022.100915

[3]	Anti-corruption and CEO compensation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China Economic Modelling, 2022 DOI:10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105697

[4]	Government subsidies, rent-seeking and corporate investment efficiency: Evidence from China Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 2021 DOI:10.21511/imfi.18(4).2021.31

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