Strategic Firm Interaction, Returns to Scale, Environmental Regulation and Ambient Charges in a Cournot Duopoly

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ISSN Print: 2150-4059
ISSN Online: 2150-4067
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E-mail: ti@scirp.org

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"Strategic Firm Interaction, Returns to Scale, Environmental Regulation and Ambient Charges in a Cournot Duopoly"
written by Sudhakar Raju, Subhadra Ganguli,
published by Technology and Investment, Vol.4 No.2, 2013

has been cited by the following article(s):

[1]	N-firm oligopolies with pollution control and random profits
	Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, 2022

[2]	The Effectiveness of Ambient Charges in a Static n-firm Cournot Oligopoly
	2021

[3]	Controlling non-point source pollution in Cournot oligopolies with hyperbolic demand
	2021

[4]	Effective Ambient Charges in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
	2021

[5]	The Effectiveness of Ambient Charges in an n-firm Cournot Oligopoly
	2020

[6]	Environmental regulation for non-point source pollution in a cournot three-stage game
	2020

[7]	Dynamic Models of Pollution Penalties and Rewards with Time Delays
	2020

[8]	Controlling Non $ point Source Pollution in Cournot Oligopolies with Hyperbolic Demand
	2019

[9]	The Ambient Charge in Hyperbolic Duopoly and Triopoly: Static and Dynamic Analysis
	2019

[10]	EFFective Ambient Charge in a Three stage Game
	2019

[11]	Chukyo University Institute of Economics Discussion Paper Series
	2019

[12]	Extended Oligopolies with Pollution Penalties and Rewards
	Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2018

[13]	Research Article Extended Oligopolies with Pollution Penalties and Rewards
	2018

[14]	Environmental effects of ambient charge in cournot oligopoly
	Cogent Food & Agriculture, 2017

[15]	Environmental Effect of Ambient Charge in a Cournot Oligopoly Market
	2017

[16]	Regulation of non-point source pollution under n-firm Bertrand competition
	2017

[17]	Environmental Policy for Non-Point Source Pollutions in a Bertrand Duopoly
	2017

[1]	Controlling non-point source pollution in Cournot oligopolies with hyperbolic demand SN Business & Economics, 2021 DOI:10.1007/s43546-020-00023-8

[2]	Dynamic Models of Pollution Penalties and Rewards with Time Delays Abstract and Applied Analysis, 2020 DOI:10.1155/2020/3162634

[3]	Environmental Economics and Computable General Equilibrium Analysis New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, 2020 DOI:10.1007/978-981-15-3970-1_16

[4]	Regulation of non-point source pollution under n-firm Bertrand competition Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2019 DOI:10.1007/s10018-019-00243-9

[5]	Theoretical and Empirical Analysis in Environmental Economics New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, 2019 DOI:10.1007/978-981-13-2363-8_1

[6]	Extended Oligopolies with Pollution Penalties and Rewards Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2018 DOI:10.1155/2018/7861432

[7]	Environmental effects of ambient charge in cournot oligopoly Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2017 DOI:10.1080/21606544.2017.1347527

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