Author(s)

Han Wu

School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.

This paper adopts the sample of heavily polluting industry listed companies’ data from 2013 to 2018, takes the amount of investment related to environmental protection in “projects under construction” divided by the capital stock as the proxy variable of environmental investment, takes the shareholding ratio of management as the proxy variable of shareholding incentive, empirically tests the relationship between the environmental investment and the incentive of stock ownership, and finds that the incentive of stock ownership significantly promotes the level of environmental investment. In addition, the incentive effect of stock ownership on the level of environmental investment only exists in the sample’s fierce industry competition.

Management Shareholding Incentives, Environmental Investment, Principal-Agent Problem

Wu, H. (2020) Management Shareholding Incentives and Enterprise Environmental Investment—Evidence from A-Share Heavily Polluting Industry Listed Companies. Modern Economy, 11, 37-50. doi: 10.4236/me.2020.111005.