The Tunneling of State-Owned Controlling Shareholders and the Incentive of Professional Manager in the Mixed Ownership Reform of Chinese

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DOI: 10.4236/me.2018.911116    908 Downloads   1,740 Views  Citations
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ABSTRACT

This paper breaks through the relationship between the administrative appointment manager and the State-Owned controlling shareholders, through taking the professional managers with fairness preferences into the State-owned enterprises corporate governance framework. It finds that the equity incentive for the manager will not affect the tunneling behavior of state-owned controlling shareholders in the State-owned enterprise which is administrative, but the equity incentive for the Professional Managers with fairness preferences can restrain the tunneling of State-Owned controlling shareholders to a certain degree. And that a more perfect legal supervision can also restrain the tunneling of State-Owned controlling shareholders. Finally, main strategies for government were suggested, including developing professional manager market, establishing an institution of professional managers, establishing a fair and open competition environment in the market, and making a more perfect legal supervision.

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Zhao, C. and Peng, H. (2018) The Tunneling of State-Owned Controlling Shareholders and the Incentive of Professional Manager in the Mixed Ownership Reform of Chinese. Modern Economy, 9, 1839-1852. doi: 10.4236/me.2018.911116.
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