Author(s)

Irinel Dragan

University of Texas, Mathematics, Arlington, Texas, USA.

In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set, we determined a family of games for which the Shapley Value is also a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the set called the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. In this paper, we shall find out in the same family of the Inverse Set, a subfamily of games with the Egalitarian Allocation is also a coalitional rational value. We show some relationship between the two sets of games, where our values are coalitional rational. Finally, we shall discuss the possibility that our procedure may be used for solving a very similar problem for other efficient values. Numerical examples show the procedure to get solutions for the efficient values.

Cooperative Games, Shapley Value, Egalitarian Allocation, Coalitional Rationality, Inverse Problem

Dragan, I. (2018) Egalitarian Allocations and the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value. American Journal of Operations Research, 8, 448-456. doi: 10.4236/ajor.2018.86025.