A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements - Theoretical Economics Letters

TEL > Vol.8 No.3, February 2018

A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements ()

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Download as PDF (Size: 284KB) PP. 241-255

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2018.83018 1,093 Downloads 2,283 Views Citations

Author(s)

Tamura Masaoki

Affiliation(s)

Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Nisshin, Japan.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the signaling roles of political parties and political advertising. Although politicians’ types are unobservable during an election, their party affiliations and political advertisements are observable to the voters. Through these two political behaviors, politicians can reveal their hidden types to the public. We extend Snyder and Ting to a multi-period model with the possibility of reelection and examine the roles and relationships of political parties and advertisements. We show that political parties are not sufficient signals to reveal politicians’ types. Political advertisements work as a complementary signal to political parties. With political parties and advertisements, voters can elect their favored candidates adequately. Even if the advertisements are a waste of money, they contribute to voting for favored candidates.

KEYWORDS

Signaling, Political Economics, Reelection, Political Party, Political Advertise-ments

Share and Cite:

Masaoki, T. (2018) A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements. Theoretical Economics Letters, 8, 241-255. doi: 10.4236/tel.2018.83018.

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