The Mixed Berge Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games - Theoretical Economics Letters

TEL > Vol.7 No.7, December 2017

The Mixed Berge Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games ()

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Download as PDF (Size: 447KB) PP. 2230-2238

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2017.77152 1,094 Downloads 3,072 Views Citations

Author(s)

Ahmad Nahhas^*, H. W. Corley

Affiliation(s)

Center on Stochastic Modeling, Optimization, and Statistics, The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA.

ABSTRACT

In this paper we apply the concept of a mixed Berge equilibrium to finite n-person games in extensive form. We study the mixed Berge equilibrium in both perfect and imperfect information finite games. In addition, we define the notion of a subgame perfect mixed Berge equilibrium and show that for a 2-person game, there always exists a subgame perfect Berge equilibrium. Thus there exists a mixed Berge equilibrium for any 2-person game in extensive form. For games with 3 or more players, however, a mixed Berge equilibrium and a subgame perfect mixed Berge equilibrium may not exist. In summary, this paper extends extensive form games to include players acting altruistically.

KEYWORDS

Mixed Berge Equilibrium, Extensive Form Games, Game Theory

Share and Cite:

Nahhas, A. and Corley, H. (2017) The Mixed Berge Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games. Theoretical Economics Letters, 7, 2230-2238. doi: 10.4236/tel.2017.77152.

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