The Fact-Value Dichotomy: A New Light on an Old Problem

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DOI: 10.4236/sm.2017.74011    1,681 Downloads   6,746 Views  Citations
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ABSTRACT

Two highly visible, but conflicting concepts of morality have found widespread acceptance in philosophy. Socrates identified goodness with wisdom, holding lack of knowledge responsible for all moral mistakes. David Hume contrasted prescriptive with descriptive judgments, leading him to the conclusion that the former, unlike the latter, are not rationally supportable. It has often been missed that the acceptance of both, Socrates’ teachings and Hume’s law, generates a conflict, as elements of these two concepts contradict each other. It would appear prima facie obvious that mankind has learned from history how to coexist and make societies more just. Hence, there must be an empirical component contained in morals. Today, we have data that are reflective of certain elements of social justice. Measurables like crime rate, range between high and low income brackets, unemployment et cetera can serve as quantitative indicators for individual components that contribute to social justice. Such evidence corroborates at least a restriction on Hume’s stance, if not an outright negation. Because there are rational and empirical elements underlying morality, thought models need to be calibrated against the real world for validation. The discussion, what constitutes progress and social justice, must consult history and research—not ideology—as sources of justification. Philosophy and the sciences must cross-fertilize each other.

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Weber, G. (2017) The Fact-Value Dichotomy: A New Light on an Old Problem. Sociology Mind, 7, 154-170. doi: 10.4236/sm.2017.74011.

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