Optimal Apartment Cleaning by Harried College Students: A Game-Theoretic Analysis - Theoretical Economics Letters

TEL > Vol.7 No.5, August 2017

Optimal Apartment Cleaning by Harried College Students: A Game-Theoretic Analysis ()

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Download as PDF (Size: 256KB) PP. 1255-1260

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2017.75085 784 Downloads 1,371 Views Citations

Author(s)

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Affiliation(s)

Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, USA.

ABSTRACT

In this note, we use a simple game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment that is shared by n∈N college students who are pressed for time. From an individual standpoint, these students dislike cleaning. However, they also prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one. Hence, for any student i, where i =1,…n, this student’s utility is the total number of hours spent by all the n students cleaning less a threshold d times the hours spent cleaning by himself. In this setting, we first determine the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when the threshold d is less than unity. Second, we find the Nash equilibrium cleanup times when the threshold d is greater than unity. Finally, for specific values of n and the threshold d, we investigate whether the second Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient.

KEYWORDS

Apartment, Cleanup, College Student, Nash Equilibrium, Static Game

Share and Cite:

Batabyal, A. (2017) Optimal Apartment Cleaning by Harried College Students: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Theoretical Economics Letters, 7, 1255-1260. doi: 10.4236/tel.2017.75085.

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