Research on the Dilemma of Speculation in Chinese Stock Market Based on Game Theory

HTML  XML Download Download as PDF (Size: 512KB)  PP. 678-685  
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2016.64072    2,211 Downloads   3,452 Views  Citations
Author(s)

ABSTRACT

In this paper, the Chinese stock market is analyzed from the perspective of participating in the game. Under the interaction of the participants, the model forms two stable equilibriums. The ideal equilibrium is that most people tend to invest in real investment rather than speculation. Speculation is not the mainstream of the market, however, most people choose to follow the trend of speculation, and the entire stock market speculation prevails, that is also a possible equilibrium. This paper argues that the current situation of Chinese stock market speculation is in a non-ideal equilibrium, which most people choose to speculate, and the overall market environment is inclined to choose speculation, and participants continue to choose speculation, and market as a whole environment speculation prevails. As long as the belief of participant to the market environment does not change, they will not change their economic decision and the market environment will still trend to speculation, which is why the guide of regulatory department does not work and speculation in the stock market continues the root cause.

Share and Cite:

Ren, D. (2016) Research on the Dilemma of Speculation in Chinese Stock Market Based on Game Theory. Theoretical Economics Letters, 6, 678-685. doi: 10.4236/tel.2016.64072.

Copyright © 2024 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work and the related PDF file are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.