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Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow during CEO’s Tenure

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DOI: 10.4236/ti.2016.73007    1,925 Downloads   2,750 Views Citations
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationship between CEO’s tenure and their firm’s investment efficiency. Over-investment is greater in the early years than in the later years of CEO’s service. Consistent with prior literature, the results also suggest over-investment increases with firm’s internally-generated cash flow.

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Jiang, X. (2016) Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow during CEO’s Tenure. Technology and Investment, 7, 51-58. doi: 10.4236/ti.2016.73007.

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