Symmetric Stability in Symmetric Games

HTML  XML Download Download as PDF (Size: 440KB)  PP. 488-493  
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2016.63056    1,665 Downloads   2,517 Views  Citations
Author(s)

ABSTRACT

The idea of symmetric stability of symmetric equilibria is introduced which is relevant, e.g., for the comparative-statics of symmetric equilibria with symmetric shocks. I show that symmetric stability can be expressed in a two-player reduced-form version of the N-player game, derive an elementary relation between symmetric stability and the existence of exactly one symmetric equilibrium, and apply symmetric stability to a two-dimensional N-player contest.

Share and Cite:

Hefti, A. (2016) Symmetric Stability in Symmetric Games. Theoretical Economics Letters, 6, 488-493. doi: 10.4236/tel.2016.63056.

Copyright © 2024 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work and the related PDF file are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.