Nature of Controlling Stake, Manager Shareholding, and R&D Investment

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DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2015.55033    7,081 Downloads   8,010 Views  Citations
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ABSTRACT

This paper makes an empirical analysis on influence relation of manager equity compensation on R&D investment under different nature of controlling stake by applying multivariate regression analysis and ordinary least square and taking China listed companies from 2007-2012 as samples. The study finds that in state controlled enterprises, management shareholding ratio has positive influence relation on R&D investment intensity; in non-state-controlled enterprises, management shareholding ratio has “range effect” influence relation on R&D investment intensity. The research of this paper can further expand existing relevant theory of corporate governance and R&D investment, and provide theoretical support and decision reference for enterprises to optimize compensation contract and correct R&D underinvestment.

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Liu, Z. and Liu, B. (2015) Nature of Controlling Stake, Manager Shareholding, and R&D Investment. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 5, 324-333. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2015.55033.

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