The Monitoring Role of Financial Analysts: An International Evidence

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DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2015.55027    3,978 Downloads   5,115 Views  Citations

ABSTRACT

This study investigates whether high analyst coverage improves the quality of reported accounting numbers. Using conservatism in financial reporting as a proxy for the quality of reported earnings, we find evidence that analysts’ activities are not positively associated with accounting conservatism. The findings indicate that firms choose less conservative accounting methods when they are covered by more analysts. They are consistent with the notion that analysts’ activities do not substitute for other corporate governance mechanisms.

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Marhfor, A. , Ghilal, R. and M’Zali, B. (2015) The Monitoring Role of Financial Analysts: An International Evidence. American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 5, 258-263. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2015.55027.

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