Author(s)

Alessandro Dell’Anna, Alfredo Paternoster

Department of Arts Philosophy, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy.
Department of Philosophy, University of Genova, Genova, Italy.

The paper discusses some recent suggestions offered by the so-called sensorimotor (or enactivist) theorists as to the problem of the explanatory gap, that is, the alleged impossibility of accounting for phenomenal consciousness in any scientific theory. We argue in the paper that, although some enactivist theorists’ suggestions appear fresh and eye-opening, the claim that the explanatory gap is (dis)solved is much overstated.

Sensorimotor Approach; Enaction; Phenomenal Consciousness; Externalism; Explanatory Gap

Dell’Anna, A. and Paternoster, A. (2013) Phenomenal Consciousness and the Sensorimotor Approach. A Critical Account. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 435-442. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34064.