Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining - Theoretical Economics Letters

TEL > Vol.3 No.5, September 2013

Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining ()

HTML

Download as PDF (Size: 87KB) PP. 40-44

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2007 3,710 Downloads 5,718 Views Citations

Author(s)

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Bryan C. McCannon

Affiliation(s)

.
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom.

ABSTRACT

In this note, we provide a new explanation for the “failure” of plea bargaining. We show in a model of asymmetric information that a public prosecutor facing re-election takes cases to the courtroom to signal quality even when her welfare (absent retention motivation) is always higher from plea bargaining.

KEYWORDS

Plea Bargaining; Re-Election; Prosecutor

Share and Cite:

S. Bandyopadhyay and B. McCannon, "Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 5B, 2013, pp. 40-44. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2007.

Journals Menu

Follow SCIRP

	+1 323-425-8868
	customer@scirp.org
	+86 18163351462(WhatsApp)
	1655362766

	Paper Publishing WeChat

Journals Menu

Home

About SCIRP

Service

Policies