Author(s)

Gang Peng, Mingrui Zou, Sammy Chan

Departmentof Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China.

In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretical solution to the multi-path routing problem in wireless ad hoc networks comprising selfish nodes with hidden information and actions. By incorporating a suitable traffic allocation policy, the proposed mechanism results in Nash equilibria where each node honestly reveals its true cost, and forwarding subgame perfect equilibrium in which each node does provide forwarding service with its declared service reliability. Based on the generalised second price auction, this mechanism effectively alleviates the over-payment of the well-known VCG mechanism. The effectiveness of this mechanism will be shown through simulations.

Wireless ad hoc network, non-cooperative networks, hidden information, hidden action, mechanism design, GSP auction.

G. Peng, M. Zou and S. Chan, "Reliable Multi-path Routing in Selfish Networks with Hidden Information and Actions," Journal of Software Engineering and Applications, Vol. 5 No. 12B, 2012, pp. 30-35. doi: 10.4236/jsea.2012.512B007.