Author(s)

Leonid Perlovsky

Harvard University, Charlestown, USA.

Freedom of will is fundamental to morality, intuition of self, and normal functioning of society. However, science does not provide a clear logical foundation for this idea. This paper considers the fundamental argument against free will, so called reductionism, and why the choice for dualism against monism, follows logically. Then, the paper summarizes unexpected conclusions from recent discoveries in cognitive science. Classical logic turns out not to be a fundamental mechanism of the mind. It is replaced by dynamic logic. Mathematical and experimental evidence are considered conceptually. Dynamic logic counters logical arguments for reductionism. Contemporary science of mind is not reducible; free will can be scientifically accepted along with scientific monism.

Free Will; Cognitive Science; Philosophy; Logic; Dynamic Logic; Reductionism; Mind

Perlovsky, L. (2012). Free Will and Advances in Cognitive Science. Open Journal of Philosophy, 2, 32-37. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.21005.