G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, “Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations,” Management Science, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2005, pp. 30-44. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Optimal Capacity Expansion Policy with a Deductible Reservation Contract

  AUTHORS: Jianbin Li, Minghui Xu, Ruina Yang

  KEYWORDS: Supply Chain, Capacity Expansion, Deductible Reservation Contract, Stackelberg Game

  JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Service Science and Management, Vol.4 No.1, March 8, 2011

  ABSTRACT: This paper investigates an optimal capacity expansion policy for innovative product in a context of one supplier and one retailer. With a fully deductible contract, we employ the Stackelberg game model to examine the negotiation process of capacity expansion in a single period. We first derive the retailer's optimal reservation strategy and then characterize the optimal capacity expansion policy for the supplier. We also investigate the impacts of reservation price on the optimal strategy of capacity reservation and expansion as well as the supplier’s expected profits.