H. Feldmann, “Central Bank Independence, Wage Bargaining, and Labor market Performance: New Evidence,” Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 77, No. 3, 2011, pp. 692-725. doi.org/10.4284/sej.2011.77.3.692

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Central Bank’s Independence and Stock Prices

  AUTHORS: Yutaka Kurihara, Koichiro Morikawa, Sadayoshi Takaya

  KEYWORDS: Central Bank Independence; Monetary Policy; Stock Price

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.3 No.6, October 31, 2012

  ABSTRACT: Since the end of 1990s, the independence of central bank independence has been discussed. In the past, central banks tried to improve their independence to combat inflation. This independence has been evaluated relative to adequate economic policy and stable economic growth. This article examines the effect of central bank independence on stock market prices and finds evidence for a positive return in developed countries; moreover, for stock prices, economic independence of the central bank seems to be more important than political independence.