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https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00821-X

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Discretion Rather Than Rules: Ramsey Policy as the Unique Outcome

  AUTHORS: Chihiro Morooka

  KEYWORDS: Macroeconomic Dynamics, Inflation Targeting, Time Consistency, Ramsey Policy, Alternately Repeated Games, Anti-Folk Theorem

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.10 No.6, November 30, 2020

  ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes finitely repeated policy games where the government and the private sector alternately revise their actions from the set of non-negative real numbers. Unlike previous studies on policy games, the one-shot inefficient Nash equilibrium, known as the Kydland-Prescott outcome, is avoided and only the optimal Ramsey outcome is established in subgame perfect equilibria. Therefore, the Ramsey policy is time-consistent in our model, whereas the Kydland-Prescott outcome is not.