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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Design on the Incentive Contract of University Achievements Commercialization Offices Based on Principal-Agent Theory

  AUTHORS: Meifang Li, Yongxiang Zhao, Feng Shi

  KEYWORDS: University Achievements Commercialization Offices (UACO), Achievements Commercialization, Principal-agent, Incentive Contract

  JOURNAL NAME: Journal of Service Science and Management, Vol.3 No.1, March 29, 2010

  ABSTRACT: Based on principal-agent theory, an incentive contract model of university achievements commercialization offices (UACO) was constructed in this paper, and an optimal incentive contract between university and UACO was researched into. The conclusion indicates that many factors, such as working ability, working willingness, risk aversion degree of UACO, as well as the outside uncertain factors and so on, have important influences on the contract design. The efficiency of commercialization of university inventions has a squared forward growth relation with working ability, a direct proportion with working willingness, and has an inverse proportion with risk aversion degree of UACO and with outside uncertainty. Additionally, the level of hard working of UACO under the condition of information asymmetry is strictly less than that of information symmetry.