TITLE:
A Study of Reputation Effect Restricting the Moral Hazard in C2C E-Commerce
AUTHORS:
Xiaoying Xu, Maoran Ye
KEYWORDS:
Moral Hazard, Reputation Model, C2C E-Commerce
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Social Sciences,
Vol.5 No.3,
March
31,
2017
ABSTRACT: Based on repeated game and unilateral moral hazard framework, this thesis studies the formation and evolution of reputation in C2C E-Market and the restriction effect of reputation to the sellers’ moral hazard behavior. The research on reputation model shows that the formation of reputation is a dynamic process, which is regulated by sellers in C2C E-Market. In the market introducing the reputation mechanism, the most effective way to restrict moral hazard behavior is to leverage the sellers’ long-term benefits, stabilize the market, and reduce transaction cost.