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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Summary of Principal—Agent Mechanism

  AUTHORS: Ling Xu

  KEYWORDS: Agency, Incentives Mechanism, Supervision Mechanism, Governance Mechanisms Set

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.4 No.8, August 19, 2016

  ABSTRACT: Studying of the relationship between principal and agent in the academic community has caused widespread concern. It is also an inherent problem in actual management. This thesis proposes that most of researches pay attention on unilateral incentive and supervision mechanism through making a summary on many Chinese and foreign article. After reviewing of relevant research, this paper puts forward the direction of future research that governance mechanism can be combined with a variety of methods to study to classify governance mechanisms, the way the agent works together to ease agency question and so on. This paper hopes to provide a useful reference for future research.