Kagel, J.H. and Levin, D. (2002) Common Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation

  AUTHORS: Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler

  KEYWORDS: Procurement Auctions, Renegotiation, Bidding, Equilibrium

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.4 No.8, October 7, 2014

  ABSTRACT: This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiate the contract.