Edlin, A.S. and Mandic, P.K. (2006) The Accident Externality from Driving. Journal of Political Economy, 114, 931-955. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/508030

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: The Optimal Gasoline Tax for China

  AUTHORS: C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, Jieyin Zeng

  KEYWORDS: Gasoline Tax, China

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.4 No.4, April 24, 2014

  ABSTRACT: Gasoline-powered vehicles produce many negative externalities including congestion, air pollution, global climate change, and accidents. A gasoline tax is perhaps the best policy to jointly address these externalities. This paper calculates the optimal gasoline tax for China. Using a model developed by Parry and Small [1] 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F005200650066003300380035003600300030003200350032000000 [2] 08D0C9EA79F9BACE118C8200AA004BA90B02000000080000000E0000005F005200650066003300380035003600300030003200350036000000 , we calculate the optimal adjusted Pigovian tax in China to be $1.58/gallon which is 2.65 times more than the current level. Of the externalities incorporated in this Pigovian tax, the congestion costs are taxed the most heavily, at $0.82/gallon, followed by local air pollution, accident externalities, and finally global climate change.