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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Signaling Games

  AUTHORS: Barry R. Cobb, Atin Basuchoudhary, Gregory Hartman

  KEYWORDS: Game Theory; Decision Analysis; Decision Tree; Nash Equilibrium; Signaling Game

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.1, February 26, 2013

  ABSTRACT: Signaling games are characterized by asymmetric information where the more informed player has a choice about what information to provide to its opponent. In this paper, decision trees are used to derive Nash equilibrium strategies for signaling games. We address the situation where neither player has any pure strategies at Nash equilibrium, i.e. a purely mixed strategy equilibrium. Additionally, we demonstrate that this approach can be used to determine whether certain strategies are part of a Nash equilibrium containing dominated strategies. Analyzing signaling games using a decision-theoretic approach allows the analyst to avoid testing individual strategies for equilibrium conditions and ensures a perfect Bayesian solution.