Elections in a Multi-Party Political System ()
Abstract
In a multi-party political system, candidates’ policy points disperse in general even with two candidates when parties have different feasible policy sets. Also, it is shown that extremists can influence the political outcomes with a relatively small feasible policy set.
Share and Cite:
Y. Sung, "Elections in a Multi-Party Political System,"
Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2011, pp. 18-20. doi:
10.4236/tel.2011.12005.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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