Some Notes on Modelling the Relationship between the Environment and Institutional Context

Davide Infante, Janna Smirnova

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DOI: 10.4236/me.2011.21003                

Abstract

Being a real concern of any society, environmental quality has received much attention in economic litera-ture. However, the role that the institutional context plays in environmental issues is still an open question. Since the environment and institutional context are closely interrelated through government regulation, the investigation on the relationship between environment-institutions represents a fruitful terrain for economic research. Our aim is to design research notes to study this relationship using theoretical and empirical ap-proaches, by modelling the institutional context and estimating its impact on the environment. Our notes could also shed fresh light on the issue of environmental policies and their implementation in emerging and developing economies.

Keywords

Institutional Context, Environmental Polices, Pollution, Sustainable Development

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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