[1]
|
Basel II (2004). Basel II: International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework. Geneva: Basel Committee Publications.
|
[2]
|
Chen, A. H., Robinson, K. J., & Siems, T. F. (2004). The wealth effects from a subordinated debt policy: Evidence from passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Review of Financial Economics, 13, 103 119. doi:10.1016/S1058-3300(03)00025-9
|
[3]
|
Evanoff, D. D., & Wall, L. D. (2001). Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures. Financial Services Research, 20, 121-145.
doi:10.1023/A:1012408023269
|
[4]
|
Evanoff, D. D., & Wall, L. D. (2002). Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields, risk-based capital, and examination ratings. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26, 989 1009. doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(01)00270-9
|
[5]
|
Goyal, V. K. (2005). Market discipline of bank risk: Evidence from subordinated debt contracts. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14, 318-350. doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2004.06.002
|
[6]
|
Hamalainen, P. (2004). Mandatory subordinated debt and the corporate governance of banks. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12, 93-106. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00346.x
|
[7]
|
Hamalainen, P., Hall, M., & Howcroft, B. (2005). A framework for market discipline in bank regulatory design. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32, 183-209.
doi:10.1111/j.0306-686X.2005.00592.x
|
[8]
|
Jagtiani, J., & Lemieux, C. (2001). Market discipline prior to bank failure. Journal of Economics and Business, 53, 313-24.
doi:10.1016/S0148-6195(00)00046-1
|
[9]
|
Kane, E. J. (1987). Dangers of capital forbearance: The case of the FSLIC and “Zombie” S&Ls. Contemporary Economic Policy, 5, 77 83. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7287.1987.tb00247.x
|
[10]
|
Krishnan, C. N. V., Ritchken, P. H., & Thomson, J. B. (2005). Monitoring and controlling bank risk: Does risky debt help? The Journal of Finance, 60, 343-378. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00732.x
|
[11]
|
Lane, T. D. (1993). Market discipline. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 40, 53-88. doi:10.2307/3867377
|
[12]
|
Nier, E., & Baumann, U. (2006). Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 15, 332-361. doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2006.03.001
|
[13]
|
Sironi, A. (2003). Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: Evidence from subordinated debt issues. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, 35, 443-473. doi:10.1353/mcb.2003.0022
|