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Objects, Elements, and Affirmation of the Ethical

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DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32045    8,364 Downloads   9,435 Views   Citations

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the theory of material objects often referred to as mereological nihilism supports a fine-grained and analytically coherent reading of Emmanuel Levinas’s concept of “elements” as articulated by Levinas primarily in Totality and Infinity. This reading, in turn, allows for a second conclusion, namely the affirmation of the ethical as the possible ground of all other philosophy.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Donnelly, M. (2013). Objects, Elements, and Affirmation of the Ethical. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 285-291. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32045.

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