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Capacity Choice in a Mixed Duopoly: The Relative Performance Approach

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2013.32020    4,265 Downloads   6,755 Views   Citations

ABSTRACT

This paper studies capacity choice in a quantity-setting mixed duopoly with differentiated goods, when the objective function of the private firm is its relative profit. In this paper, we show that the differences between the output levels and capacity levels between both the public firm and the private firm strictly depend on both the degrees of product differentiation and of importance of the private firms relative performance. More precisely, we find that the public firm chooses over-capacity when both the degrees of importance of the private firms relative performance and of product differentiation are sufficiently high whereas it chooses under-capacity otherwise, and further the private firm chooses under-capacity when the degree of importance of its relative performance is high as compared the degree of product differentiation whereas it chooses over-capacity otherwise.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Y. Nakamura and M. Saito, "Capacity Choice in a Mixed Duopoly: The Relative Performance Approach," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 2, 2013, pp. 124-133. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.32020.

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