Can Overconfident Executives Restrain Overinvestment?

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DOI: 10.4236/me.2017.88073    1,016 Downloads   2,073 Views  Citations
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ABSTRACT

This paper uses the data of the public company from 2013 to 2015 to explore the relationship between executives’ overconfidence and overinvestment when the company’s financing ability is different. Unlike previous studies, the result of this study shows that overconfidence may curb overinvestment when the company’s financing capacity is poor. It is when the financing capacity is strong that overconfidence will exacerbate overinvestment. A lot of studies show that overconfident executives increase overinvestment because of underestimation of risk, and our study gives a different view.

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Liu, X. (2017) Can Overconfident Executives Restrain Overinvestment?. Modern Economy, 8, 1056-1068. doi: 10.4236/me.2017.88073.

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