Decentralized Policy in Resolving Environmental Disputes with Private Information

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2011.12006    4,059 Downloads   7,920 Views  Citations
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ABSTRACT

We have design a private-information game to incorporate independent experts’ assistance. With the better information provided by experts, the mistrust of the uninformed party might be dissolved. And we may get an effective and efficient resolution outcome. We will investigate conditions under which the experts’ information may help the economy to get an efficient outcome or an effective resolution result.

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H. Lin, "Decentralized Policy in Resolving Environmental Disputes with Private Information," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2011, pp. 21-27. doi: 10.4236/tel.2011.12006.

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