Lattice Gas Model for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: Emergency of Altruism in a Company

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2016.62036    1,780 Downloads   2,502 Views  

ABSTRACT

In Japan, there exist many sustainable companies. Their distinctive feature is mutualism; they often take altruistic behaviors. To explain such behaviors, we carry out iterated prisoner’s dilemma games by lattice gas model. Each lattice point is regarded as a company which contains m + 1 players with an identical strategy. Simulations reveal that All Cooperation wins, when m takes a value larger than a threshold. We obtain a power law depending on error level. This law implies altruism may prevail in a company which has many employees or high error level.

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Yokoi, H. , Morishita, A. , Tateoka, Y. and Tainaka, K. (2016) Lattice Gas Model for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: Emergency of Altruism in a Company. Theoretical Economics Letters, 6, 324-329. doi: 10.4236/tel.2016.62036.

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