Vertical Mergers, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Foreclosure in a Network Industry

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DOI: 10.4236/me.2014.54043    3,378 Downloads   5,117 Views  
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ABSTRACT

Foreclosure through raising a network rival’s costs may not be detrimental in the short-term, but in the longer-term it may allow a predator to expand its market share. The focus of antitrust opinion in assessing potential vertical mergers should therefore be on the longer-term effects of such mergers.

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Oyenuga, A. (2014) Vertical Mergers, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Foreclosure in a Network Industry. Modern Economy, 5, 443-460. doi: 10.4236/me.2014.54043.

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